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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the impacts of defined-benefit (DB) pension plans on the corporate 
investment choices between diversifying and non-diversifying investments. We find a firm’s 
DB plan coverage is negatively associated with its propensity of making a major investment. 
Subject to a major investment decision, however, the firm with higher DB plan coverage is 
more likely to diversify, i.e., acquire firms abroad or in other industries, rather than invest in 
fixed assets or make non-diversifying (i.e., domestic horizontal) acquisitions. Moreover, in 
diversifying acquisitions, they are more likely to invest in countries or industries with a 
strongly unionized workforce. Further analysis on post-investment performance shows that 
firms with higher DB plan coverage experience a greater improvement in operating 
profitability after a diversifying acquisition, and the improvement mainly comes from a higher 
asset turnover rather than cost reduction. On the other hand, DB plan sponsoring firms 
experience a decline in profitability after a large capital expenditure or a non-diversifying 
acquisition. We propose that both the bargaining motive and the conforming motive can 
explain these results. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At present there is a growing amount of research on how the corporate-
sponsored defined-benefit (DB hereafter) pension plans affect corporate investment 
decisions. Among others, Rauh (2006) shows that the mandatory contribution to 
DB pension funds results in lower investment in fixed assets. Chang, Kang, and 
Zhang (2012) conclude that firms with more DB pension plan deficits are more 
likely to engage in value-enhancing mergers. Cocco and Volpin (2013) indicate that 
firms sponsoring DB pension plans are less likely to be a takeover target while the 
acquirer firms with DB pension plans are more likely to pay in cash than their 
counterparts without such plans. The above studies mainly focus on how a  DB plan 
affects a particular type of investment. However, we still know little about its 
impacts on corporate investment decisions and the channels through which pension 
plans affect corporate investment choice. 
Our paper contributes to the literature by demonstrating that DB pension plans  
affect the firms’ decisions on capital expenditure and choice of investment industries 
and locations. We propose that both the bargaining motive, and the conforming  
motive implied by the stakeholder theory can explain firms’ investment choices. The 
bargaining motive predicts that firms invest strategically to reduce employees’ 
influence over corporate resource allocations. Previous studies and anecdotal 
evidences widely suggest that employees have strong incentives to fight for  
better compensation through threats of actions, especially in good states of firm 
performance. We argue that the existence of DB pension plans reflects 
employees’ bargaining power because unionized workers generally have a much 
higher participation rate in DB plans than non-unionized workers.1 When facing strong 
employees’ bargaining power, the firms would respond strategically by changing their 
investment decisions. Several theoretical models imply that firms can strengthen their 
bargaining position against the employees through under-investment (Baldwin 1983; 
Grout 1984), cross-industry diversification (Rose 1991), moving their investments 
towards overseas plants (Lommerud, Meland, and Sorgard 2003; and Eckel and Egger 
2009), or carrying out international or vertical acquisitions (Lommerud, Staume, and 
Sorgard 2006).2 
The conforming motive, on the other hand, predicts that firm managers would consider 
employees’ benefits and concerns while aiming at increasing shareholders’ value in 
investment decisions. Recent studies on the stakeholder theory of capital structure 
show that firms would take employees’ benefits into consideration when deciding their 
debt policies (Bae, Kang, and Wang 2013) and higher debt ratios do result in higher 
compensation to top managers and employees (Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang 
1  Nowadays, although the powers of labor unions are declining and more and more firms are shifting their 
pension plans towards defined-contribution schemes, unionized workers still have a much higher 
participation rate in DB plans than non-unionized workers (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013). At present 
when firms shift away from DB to DC plans, they mostly keep the pension benefits of existing 
employees unchanged while excluding new hires from DB pension plans. Therefore, the existence of 
DB plans and the extent thereof indicate the employees’ bargaining power in a firm. Besides changing 
their investment strategies, firms can strategically reduce the financial resources on the bargaining table 
by adopting a tightened financial policy to increase their bargaining power. See Perotti and Spier (1993), 
Klasa, Maxwell, Molina (2009), and Matsa excluding new hires from DB pension plans. Therefore, the 
existence of DB plans and the extent thereof indicate the employees’ bargaining power in a firm. 
2  Besides changing their investment strategies, firms can strategically reduce the financial resources on 
the bargaining table by adopting a tightened financial policy to increase their bargaining power.  
See Perotti and Spier (1993), Klasa, Maxwell, Molina (2009), and Matsa (2010) for examples and 
detailed discussions. 
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2013). Compared to defined- contribution (DC hereafter) pension plans, DB plans are 
not only more costly to maintain (Comprix and Muller 2011; Rauh, Stefanescu, and 
Zeldes 2013) but also expose sponsoring firms to additional funding risks arising  
from financial market fluctuations, uncertainties in participants’ longevity, employees’ 
mobility, among others (Rauh 2006; Shivdasani and Stefanescu 2010; Cocco and 
Volpin 2013). Subjecting to competitive disadvantages in their operating industries, a 
DB plan sponsoring firm has strong incentives of investing abroad or other industries to 
reduce its financial risk. Previous studies find that geographical or product-market 
diversification provides benefits by moderating stock return volatility (Fatemi 1984), 
lowering the cost of capital (Yan 2006; Hovakimian 2011; Hann, Ogneva, and Ozbas 
2013), and increasing financial flexibility (Jang 2016). From the employees’ 
perspective, they are essentially the long-term creditors of DB plan sponsoring firms, 
and their propensity of receiving full pension benefits upon retirement depends on their 
employers’ financial viability. As a result, employees receiving DB-plan benefits also 
hope their employers to invest safely and reduce the cash-flow risk by diversification. 
In short, both bargaining motive and conforming motive indicate not only a lower 
propensity of investment but also an investment preference towards abroad or new 
industries over local or similar industries. However, the two theories predict differently 
on the post-investment performances, as well as choices of target countries and target 
industries in diversifying (cross-border or cross-industry) acquisitions. 3  Firstly, the 
bargaining motive implies that DB-plan sponsoring firms achieve better operating 
performance by gaining a stronger bargaining power against local employees. 
Consequently, the improvement in performance after a diversifying acquisition  
should mostly come from reduction of costs, especially labor-related expenses. The 
conforming motive, however, suggests that the DB plan sponsoring firms would 
improve their operating performance by other methods such as augmenting the 
operating efficiency rather than cutting labor-related expenses. Secondly, the 
bargaining motive predicts DB-plan sponsoring firms to invest in countries or industries 
with weak unionized workforce so as to prevent incumbent labor unions from joining 
force with unions in the countries or industries of new investments. The conforming 
motive, however, predicts DB-plan sponsoring firms would invest in countries or 
industries with strong unionized workforce. Although investing abroad or in other 
industries can reduce DB plan sponsoring firms’ cash flow risks, the decision could also 
be viewed as an unfriendly strategy of keeping new investments out of touch by 
existing employees.4 In order to gain the employees’ support for new investments,  
DB-plan sponsoring firms have to commit and cement their relations with unionized 
workforces by investing in countries or industries with strong union power but higher 
labor productivity.5 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that empirically tests the 
implications of both bargaining and conforming motives of corporate investment. 
Utilizing information gleaned from United States (US) Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
Form 5500 filings that cover all US pension plans with at least 100 participants,  
we construct our proxy for DB plan coverage as the ratio of DB pension plan assets to 
3  In the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature, diversifying acquisitions mostly refer to cross-industry 
acquisitions. However, as firms can diversify their risks by acquiring firms or assets abroad, we classify 
diversifying acquisitions as either cross- border or cross-industry acquisitions, and non-diversifying 
acquisitions as domestic horizontal acquisitions. 
4  For example, a firm’s foreign subsidiary is not liable for the parent firm’s DB plan liabilities. As a result, 
the parent firm’s DB pension plans are protected by fewer assets. We thank the guest editor for 
providing this argument. 
5  We thank the anonymous referee for providing this direction to disentangle the two hypotheses. 
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total pension assets. Examining a sample of 27,883 US manufacturing firm-years in 
1990–2003, we find that DB plan coverage is negatively associated with the propensity 
of a major investment defined as a large capital expenditure or an acquisition of a firm. 
A one-standard-deviation increase in DB plan coverage is associated with a reduction 
of 0.062 in odds ratio for acquisition and 0.244 in odds ratio for large capital 
expenditure. Subject to a major investment decision, a firm with higher DB plan 
coverage is more likely to acquire rather than to invest in fixed assets. A one-standard-
deviation of increase in DB-plan coverage is related to an increase of 0.217 in odds 
ratio of acquisition versus capital expenditure. Among various forms of acquisitions, a 
firm with higher DB plan coverage prefers diversifying acquisition over non-diversifying 
acquisition. A one-standard-deviation of increase in DB plan coverage is linked with an 
increase of 0.184 in odds ratio of diversifying acquisition versus non-diversifying 
acquisition. The above findings are consistent with both bargaining motive and 
conforming motive that higher DB-plan coverage results in less investment and the 
dominance of diversifying acquisitions over non-diversifying investments. 
To test the bargaining motive versus the conforming motive, we first examine the 
financial impacts of DB plan coverage by investigating changes in operating 
performance around major investment. Our empirical result indicates that firms with 
higher DB-plan coverage tend to have lower return on assets after a big capital 
expenditure or a non-diversifying acquisition. Further analysis shows that the result is 
related to a decline in operating profit margin and increase in pension expense, but 
unrelated to change in asset turnover. The finding is consistent with the bargaining 
motive that firms with higher DB plan coverage would avoid large local investments 
because such investments will further expose their assets to local union forces while 
workers in the same industry with common interests can join forces more easily. 
On the other hand, our empirical evidence shows that diversifying acquisitions bring in 
higher return on assets for firms with higher DB plan coverage, and the improvement in 
operating profitability is related to improvement in asset turnover rather than cost 
cutting effort. Therefore, the finding is inconsistent with the bargaining motive but 
consistent with the conforming motive, which indicates that cost-cutting is not the main 
motive of diversifying acquisitions. 
We then examine the impact of DB plan coverage on acquirers’ choice of target 
location and target industry in diversifying acquisitions. The bargaining motive predicts 
that firms with higher DB-plan coverage will invest in countries and industries with 
weaker union power, while the conforming motive predicts the opposite. Two 
measurements are employed to test these two predictions. For each cross-border 
acquisition, we gauge a target country’s labor power with the collective relations law 
index constructed by Botero et al. (2004). We then compute the average value of all 
countries in which a firm has carried out it cross-border deals to measure its preference 
of labor power in cross-border acquisitions. We measure firm’s preference of labor 
power in cross-industry acquisitions in a similar way by using the industry unionization 
rate provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson available at www.unionstats.com. 
Our finding supports the conforming motive but not the bargaining motive. Together 
with the above finding for operating performances, we suggest that weakening labor 
bargaining power is not the main objective of diversifying acquisitions by DB plan 
sponsoring firms. Instead, those firms are willing to consider employees’ job-related 
concerns when they choose the location and industry of acquisition. 
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We perform additional tests to show the robustness of our main findings. First, previous 
studies find that other than employees’ bargaining power, cross-border acquisitions are 
driven by many factors such as cross-border trade activity, corporate tax rate, 
institutional ownership, and so on. Our main results for investment choice survive after 
controlling those factors. Second, we perform an additional test to address the potential 
endogeneity concern. Examining change in performance rather than the level of 
performance can eliminate omitted time-invariant firm characteristics that could cause a 
spurious relation between DB plan coverage and firm performance. However, some 
time-varying omitted firm or industry characteristics may still simultaneously affect DB 
plan coverage and firm performance. For example, technological development and 
trade liberalization may change a firm’s investment opportunities and labor policies. We 
address the endogeneity concern by using instrumental variable regressions with firm 
fixed effects. The main results are qualitatively unchanged, implying the robustness of 
our empirical evidences. 
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. Firstly, although the impact of 
employees’ bargaining power on corporate investment choice has been investigated 
theoretically, the empirical evidences are scant (Clougherty et al. 2014). We find that 
higher DB plan coverage induces more diversifying acquisitions rather than non-
diversifying acquisitions or capital expenditures. Although the finding is consistent with 
the theoretical predictions proposed by Rose (1991), Lommerud, Straume, and 
Sorgard (2003, 2006), and Eckel and Egger (2009) that firms shift capital outside their 
core areas in response to increasing labor power, our evidence suggests that cutting 
costs is not the main objective of diversifying acquisitions by DB plan sponsoring firms. 
At the same time, DB plan sponsoring firms indeed avoid investing in existing 
industries because cost synergies are difficult to realize when labor power is strong. In 
sum, our findings support both bargaining and conforming motives of DB plan 
sponsoring firms in investment decisions. 
Secondly, our study sheds new light on the growing literature on cross-border mergers. 
Previous studies find that at the aggregate level, the volumes of cross-border merger 
are driven by country factors such as accounting standards, corporate governance, 
investor protection (Rossi and Volpin 2004; Martynova and Renneboog 2008), taxation 
(Scholes and Wolfson 1990; Huizinga and Voget 2009), culture (Ahern, Daminelli, and 
Fracassi 2015), as well as geographical distance, quality of accounting disclosure, and 
bilateral trade (Erel, Liao, and Weisbach 2014). At the firm level, cross-border mergers 
create value by binding targets from countries with lower standards of corporate 
governance and investor protection with the higher standards in bidders’ countries 
(Bris, Brisley, and Cabolis 2008; Bris and Cabolis 2008), governing targets by foreign 
institutional investors (Ferreira, Massa, and Matos 2010), and disciplining poorly 
performing CEOs in countries with weak investor protection (Lel and Miller 2015). Our 
results show that corporate pension plans induce firms to invest abroad but the 
motivations are more complicated than reducing labor influence through shifting assets 
abroad or to other industries. 
The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides institutional 
background and reviews prior research. Section 3 describes data and construction of 
key variables. Section 4 presents the main empirical results. Section 5 compares our 
research with other studies for cross-border M&As and provides robustness check. 
Finally, Section 6 concludes. 
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2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND  
AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
Firms generally offer two types of pension plans to their employees, namely defined- 
benefit plans and defined-contribution plans. The main difference between DB and DC 
plans is that the firms with DB plans promise the employees a fixed retirement benefit 
defined by a given formula, which is usually a function of the employee’s tenure, wage 
(usually in the final year), and sometimes age, while the firms with DC plans provide 
fixed annual contributions to a pension fund. In recent years, there has been an 
increasing trend for US companies to switch from DB to DC pension plans or freeze the 
existing DB plans and shut out new hires. The share of DB plan assets has dropped 
from 65% in 1995 to 40% in 2005 (Broadbent, Palumbo, and Woodman 2006). From 
the employer’s perspective, DC plans are less costly to maintain than DB plans. A 
direct benefit of freezing DB plans is that the pension liability is immediately reduced by 
the amount of expected future benefits, which significantly improves funding status of 
plans and the bottom line (Comprix and Muller 2011). Rauh, Stefanescu, and Zeldes 
(2013) find that firms save 2.7%–3.6% of payroll per year by shifting from DB to DC 
plans over a 10-year horizon. Moreover, shifting to DC plans reduce firms’ uncertainty 
for their future contributions to DB plans which are affected by the expected rate of 
return of asset and market interest rates. 
2.1 DB Plan and Employees’ Bargaining Power 
The extent of DB plans reflects employees’ bargaining power for three reasons. First, 
compared with a DC plan, an employee’s pension benefit under a typical DB plan is 
“back- loaded” and is mostly predetermined by a formula based on his (her) earnings 
before retirement (Kapinos 2009). As a result, employees in DB plans face a higher 
cost of job change and their values of outside options are lower. They are more 
concerned about and more loyal towards their employers’ long-term prospects than 
employees in DC plans. Employees covered by DB plans are hence expected to have 
strong incentives to stay and bargain collectively with their employers when their 
benefits are threatened, while employees under DC plans are more likely to consider 
outside options and leave if they are not satisfied with the pension benefits offered by 
the employers. 
Secondly, many corporate-sponsored DB plans are reached through collective 
bargaining and most of them were set up in earlier years when labor unions were 
strong enough to protect the employees’ post-retirement benefits. Although labor union 
power is declining and there is a growing trend of moving towards DC plans, unionized 
workers still have a much higher participation rate in DB plans than non-unionized 
workers. A survey by the Bureau of Labour Statistics (2013) shows that the unionized 
workers enjoy better retirement benefits than the non-unionized workers. The former 
group is much more likely to own corporate-sponsored pension plans (86% versus 
45%), and to be covered by the DB plans (68% versus 11%). As firms are shifting  
to DC plans due to the cost disadvantages of DB plans, the percentage of frozen DB 
plans is also much higher for non-unionized workers than that for their unionized 
counterparts (33% versus 15%). In contrast, the participation rates of the defined 
contribution (DC) pension plans are very close for the two groups of workers  
(44% versus 42%).6 
6  See “National Compensation Survey: Employee Benefits in the United States, March 2013” by Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
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Thirdly, most employers have been shifting away from DB plans in recent years. They 
keep the pension benefits of existing employees unchanged and exclude new hires 
from DB pension plans so as to reduce the resistance from current workers and labor 
unions. This strategy is believed to reduce the alignment between new and existing 
employees, and hurt employees’ bargaining power and collective forces. Indeed, quite 
a few of the labor strikes nowadays are caused by employers’ attempting to freeze old 
DB plans while offering DC plans to new employees. 7  For example, Bob Woods, 
spokesperson of The International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers 
(IAM), said In These Times during the strike against Lockheed Martin in April 2012: 
The first time..., they take away pension for new hires. Next time around, when 
new hires [are in the union], they say ‘we are going to freeze the pension.’ Of 
course, the new hires that don't have a pension aren't going to strike, so then 
the pension is frozen ... Companies like Lockheed Martin simply want to 
eliminate defined benefit pensions plans. 
Facing strong employees’ bargaining power, the firms would respond strategically by 
changing their investment decisions. Baldwin (1983) and Grout (1984) theoretically 
demonstrate that the renegotiation risk causes firms to under-invest in the face of 
strong labor bargaining power, as evidenced by Hirsch (1992), and Bronars and Deere 
(1993). The firms can also improve their bargaining position in relation to their 
employees by moving their investments towards overseas plants, or carrying out 
international or vertical acquisitions.8 The international oligopoly model by Lommerud, 
Staume, and Sorgard (2006) shows that a cross-border acquisition triggers increased 
competition between labor unions for job security and firm’s commitment to future 
investments because the firm can exploit the potential of shifting inputs and production 
between plants in different countries. Such union rivalry consequently leads to workers’ 
concession on wage, which has been an important determinant of a firm’s decision to 
invest abroad. Moreover, it is more difficult for unions in different locations to cooperate 
than unions in the same location. This reality further weakens the employees’ 
bargaining power. The equilibrium market structure implies that a cross-border 
acquisition is an effective corporate strategy to reduce union rents. Lommerud, Meland, 
and Sorgard (2003), and Eckel and Egger (2009) predict that investing and producing 
abroad can increase a firm’s bargaining power by allowing it to continue its operations 
even in the case of disagreement with local workers. The theoretical model developed 
by Rose (1991) also implies that cross-industry diversification can improve a firm’s 
ability to take strikes and reduce wage settlements. It can be expected that diversifying 
acquisitions would have a similar effect on employees’ bargaining power as cross-
border acquisitions. As labor unions exist to protect workers with similar working 
conditions and interests, it is difficult for labor unions representing workers in different 
industries to collude with each other. 
Diversifying acquisitions are also less likely to induce the “envy effect” than non-
diversifying acquisitions because the acquired overseas businesses are remotely 
comparable to the original one. Goel and Thakor (2005) demonstrate that an agent’s 
utility increases with what she/he has and decreases with what others have due to 
social status (Frank 1984) or equity considerations (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Envious 
workers may even attempt to sabotage other workers (Lazear 1989). Goel and Thakor 
7  There are generally two types of pension plan freeze. A “hard” freeze eliminates the accrual of new 
benefits for all employees, while a “soft” freeze excludes some classes of employees, usually new 
employees, from the accrual of benefits under the old plan. 
8  Alternatively, firms can strategically reduce the financial resources on the bargaining table by adopting a 
tightened financial policy to increase their bargaining power. See Perotti and Spier (1993), Klasa, 
Maxwell, Molina (2009), and Matsa (2010) for examples and detailed discussions. 
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(2005) also argue that people are jealous of those who are close and comparable  
to them. In a workplace, workers will compare their compensation packages with  
others doing the same tasks. As DB plans generally offer higher and more stable  
post-retirement benefits than DC plans, it is likely that employees under DC plans will  
be envious of their colleagues under DB plans. Therefore, even a firm with high DB  
plan coverage may have identified a potential target with low DB-plan coverage in the 
same industry or in the same country, it may have to consider the additional costs  
and problems in lining up the compensation packages of employees from different 
original firms. 
The above bargaining view implies that DB plan sponsoring firms can dilute the 
influence of labor unions by investing in foreign countries and industries with weak 
presence of labor unions. In particular, by shifting capital abroad, firms are subject to 
less scrutiny by local labor unions over corporate resources if the local unions do not 
have a strong partner in the foreign countries where the firm’s assets are located. 
2.2 DB Plan and Financial Risk 
In offering a DB pension plan, a sponsoring firm is not free from financial liability after 
making its contributions to the plan. The value of DB plan assets is volatile and 
depends on quite a few of factors including a pension fund’s asset allocation, risk 
management and investment performance, as well as the pension plan participant’s 
longevity and employee mobility. When the market value of the pension asset is less 
than the pension liability, the pension plan is in deficit. In this case, the sponsoring 
firms are required to make up the difference. 
Previous studies suggest DB plan sponsoring firms have larger financial burdens and 
are more opaque than its counterpart. Rauh (2006) indicates that the mandatory 
contribution to DB pension changes a firm’s internal financial resources and reduces its 
capital expenditures. Bakke and Whited (2012) show that Rauh’s finding is driven by 
the sample of heavily underfunded firms. They further find that the mandatory 
contribution also affects research, development, and employment growth. In addition to 
the mandatory contribution, the DB pension deficit is also a long-term liability to the 
firm. Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010) find that firms’ debt ratios are indeed 35% 
higher if the pension liabilities had been considered as debt, and firms with higher 
pension liabilities have lower debt ratios, consistent with the trade-off theory of capital 
structure. All of these contribute to the uncertainty of the firms’ internal financial 
resources. In addition, Cocco and Volpin (2013) argue that DB pension plans increase 
firms’ information asymmetry and therefore act as a takeover deterrent when the 
potential acquirers are worried about the lemon problem. They show that firms 
sponsoring DB plans are less likely to be a takeover target. Moreover, these firms are 
more likely to use cash rather than stock when acquiring other firms. The explanation 
they propose is that the uncertainty in the value of DB plan liabilities expose the merger 
counterparty to additional risk and information asymmetry. Therefore, DB plan is costly 
to maintain and the uncertainty in the pension fund investment increases firms’ 
financial risk. 
Financial burdens may harm a  firm’s relationship with its employees and other 
stakeholders when firm-specific or asset-specific investments are subject to a large 
cost in liquidation (Titman 1984). Therefore, firms in financial distress always face the 
choice between losing their business partners and valuable employees, and using 
resources to maintain such relationships. Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) 
theoretically show that the costs of human capital can sometimes be so high as to 
stop firms from issuing debt. Chemmanur, Cheng, and Zhang (2013) empirically find 
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that employee pay is positively related to financial leverage. Both suggest that labor 
costs affect the financing decision. 
Motivated by these studies, we argue that DB plan sponsoring firms with pension 
liabilities have stronger needs than their counterparts to address labor concerns in 
their investment decisions by investing less or making investments that will not 
exacerbate their financial risks. As diversification can reduce cash flow volatility and 
therefore the likelihood of bankruptcy, we expect DB plan sponsoring firms are more 
likely to acquire firms abroad or in other industries. However, regarding diversifying 
acquisitions as a strategy to reduce their bargaining power, the employees may  
fight hard to block acquisitions that shift capital outside the core businesses. To 
maintain the relationship with their employees, the firms can show their conformity 
to unionized workforce by investing in countries with high labor protection standards 
and union coverage such as the Scandinavian countries, or in industries with strong 
presence of labor unions. Therefore, the conforming view suggests that DB plan 
sponsoring firms may invest in countries or industries with stronger presence of labor 
unions to moderate employees’ concern about financial risks and bargaining power. 
3. DATA SAMPLE, CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES, 
AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
3.1 Data Sample 
Our sample covers the manufacturing firms (SIC 2000–3999) in CRSP/Compustat 
Merged Database and IRS 5500 filings compiled by Centre for Retirement Research  
at Boston College from 1990 to 2007. We extend the data to 2013 by downloading  
the IRS 5500 filings from The Department of Labour. We join records from 
CRSP/Compustat and IRS filings using Employer Identification Number (EIN), the only 
identifier available in both databases. We include only manufacturing firms where labor 
union activities tend to be more intensive. In addition, DB pension plans are more 
prevalent in labor-intensive manufacturing industries than in hi-tech or service 
industries. We exclude firms with missing values for the regressions on investment 
choice. Our final sample consists of 27,883 firm-years. 
The IRS 5500 filings cover both DB and DC pension plans with at least 
100 participants. Employers are required to file a separate form for each of their plans. 
The information recorded contains type and status of plan, summary statistics of 
participants, plan assets and liabilities, etc. In addition, employers are required to file 
Actuarial Information (Schedule B) for each DB plan, including in particular the 
estimation of projected benefit liabilities and the funding status of the plan. In our study, 
we aggregate plan-level data to firm level. 
3.2 DB-plan Coverage 
The main explanatory variable of this study is DB plan coverage (DB_Cover), defined 
as the value of DB plan assets over the total assets of both DB and DC plans available 
on IRS 5500 filings. Since many DB plans are usually maintained only for senior 
employees while new hires are excluded from it, an implicit assumption of this 
measurement is that more weight is given to more senior employees who tend to have 
higher values in their pension accounts. This is consistent with our assumption that DB 
plan coverage may reflect employees’ bargaining power because senior employees are 
more likely to occupy higher occupational ranks and therefore be more influential. 
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There are two potential biases of this measure of DB plan coverage. First, the value of 
pension assets fluctuates with market conditions. To check the robustness of our 
findings, we use the number of employees covered by the DB-plan as an alternative 
measurement of employee’s bargaining power and the results are qualitatively 
unchanged. 9  Secondly, Compustat provides consolidated financial information at 
parent level, while IRS 5500 filings can be made by group subsidiaries rather than the 
parents. Since the filings do not provide any information about the parent company of 
the filer, we cannot consolidate all pension plan data to the parent level. Therefore, our 
calculated pension assets may underestimate the actual pension assets for a company 
with subsidiaries. However, the missing information should add noise rather than 
systematic bias to our measure of DB plan coverage because the DB plan assets are 
scaled by total pension assets rather than total firm assets. 
Unlike most previous studies on DB pension plans (e.g., Shivdasani and Stefanescu 
2010; Chang, Kang, and Zhang 2012; Cocco and Volpin 2013), our DB plan coverage 
accounts for not only the existence but also the extent of DB plans relative to DC plans, 
which allows us to compare among firms offering different levels of DB pension plans 
to employees. 
3.3 Major Investment Decision 
We constructed two indicators to gauge the major investment decisions in a year. The 
first one is the major capital expenditure decision, LargeCAPX, which equals one if a 
firm’s capital expenditure scaled by lagged one-period total assets is above the 90th 
percentile for all sample firms in the year. 10  In a robustness check, we use 75th 
percentile as a cut-off and the results are qualitatively the same. The second one is 
major mergers and acquisitions, Acquire, which equals one if a firm acquires at least 
one firm in the year. Specifically, we collect from Thomson One for all mergers and 
acquisition transactions that are indicated as “Mergers.” We exclude acquisitions of 
minority interests or acquisitions of remaining interests because they do not involve a 
change in control. We also exclude acquisitions of assets because those deals tend to 
be small.11 
For acquirers in a year, we further check if they acquire foreign firms or firms in other 
industries, and define three types of mergers: (1) CrossBorder which equals one if a 
firm acquires at least one firm out of the US in the year; (2) CrossIndustry which equals 
one if a firm acquires at least one firm belonging to a different 4-digit SIC code; and 
(3) CBI which equals one if either CrossBorder or CrossIndustry equals one. 
3.4 Empirical Strategy and Explanatory Variables 
To examine the choice of major investment, we use the logit model for binary choices 
and the multinomial logit model for multiple (> 2) choices. More specifically, for each 
firm k that faces N+1 alternatives in year t, the utility of choice j in year t+1 is defined  
as follows:  
9  We do not report the results due to space constraints, but they are available upon request. 
10  In Compustat database, capital expenditures exclude property, plant and equipment of acquired 
companies, and net assets of businesses acquired. 
11  Our definition of Acquire does not distinguish large M&As from small M&As because Thomson One 
does not report deal values for a significant percentage of M&A transactions. From our initial collection 
of all M&As in 1970–2014, about 54% of mergers report deal values, while only about 32% of asset 
acquisitions report deal values. 
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where wkt is a set of firm-specific and industry-specific variables of interest in year t. 
Given this utility function, each firm chooses the investment type that maximizes its 
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Suppose h is the base case. Conventionally, we normalize the base case by setting βh 
to zero (Greene 2008: 844), so that we can identify the effect of firm-specific variables 
on the odds ratio by observing βj. 
We include the following firm-specific variables for the investment-choice models: 
1. DB_Cover, the key explanatory variable of interest; 
2. CashFlow, the sum of net income and depreciation minus dividends, divided by 
lagged total assets; 
3. Q, the market-to-book ratio of assets; 
4. Size, the natural logarithm of total assets in 2005 constant value; 
5. Tang, net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets; 
6. WC, net working capital less cash, divided by total assets; 
7. Div, cash dividend divided by lagged total assets; 
8. CumRet, the 12-month cumulative stock return in fiscal year t. 
All variables are one-period lagged the choice variables and they are winsorized at 1st 
and 99th percentiles of respective distributions. Furthermore, year dummies (Yrdum) 
are included to control for all firm-invariant variables and adjusted for trends like 
nationwide legislation or policy changes. The dummies for 2-digit SIC industries (SIC2) 
are added to control for all unobserved factors that are time-invariant and peculiar to 
each industry. 
3.5 Summary Statistics 
Panel A of Table 1 reports the distribution as well as the summary statistics for DB 
plan coverage and investment choices of the sample firms by year. Panel B reports 
the summary statistics of other key firm-specific variables used for our analysis. 
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Table 1: Distribution of Sample and Summary Statistics of Key Variables 
The sample consists of all manufacturing firms (SIC 2000–3999) that file IRS Form 5500 for 
their eligible pension plans with over 100 participants and are covered by CRSP/Compustat 
Merged Database from 1990 to 2013. Firms with missing variables for key regressions are  
also excluded. 
Panel A reports the sample distribution, and summary statistics for DB-plan coverage 
(DB_Cover) and variables for major investment decisions. Mean values by year and overall are 
reported. DB_Cover is the ratio of DB-plan assets to total pension-plan assets based on 
information in IRS Form 5000 filings. Acquire equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm in 
the year. CrossBorder equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm outside the United States 
in the year, CrossIndustry equals one if a firm acquires at least one firm in other industry, i.e., 
belonging to a different 4-digit SIC code, and CBI equals one if CrossBorder equals one or 
CrossIndustry equals one. 
Panel B reports the summary statistics for explanatory variables. DB_Cover is defined above. 
CashFlow is the sum of net income and depreciation minus dividends, divided by lagged total 
assets. Q is the market-to-book ratio of assets. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets in 
2005 constant value. Tang is net property, plant and equipment scaled by total assets. WC is 
net working capital less cash, divided by total assets. Div is cash dividend divided by lagged 
total assets. CumRet is the 12-month cumulative stock return in fiscal year. ΔR0At,t+2 is  
change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets, from  
t to t+2; Δ0Mt,t+2 is change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by  
net sales, ΔAT0t,t+2 is the change in net sales scaled by lagged total assets from t to t+2;  
and ΔPen_Empt,t+2 is the change in pension and post-retirement expense per employees  
(in thousands dollars) from t to t+2. The variables are winsorized at 1st and 99th percentiles of 
respective distributions.  
Panel A  
Year 
(1)  
N 
(2) 
DB_Cover 
(3) 
Acquire 
(4) 
CrossBorder 
(5) 
CrossIndustry 
(6) 
CBI 
1990 1,071 0.306     
1991 1,092 0.307 0.047 0.008 0.036 0.038 
1992 1,139 0.276 0.069 0.016 0.052 0.055 
1993 1,222 0.255 0.084 0.021 0.061 0.070 
1994 1,364 0.241 0.087 0.024 0.068 0.074 
1995 1,441 0.225 0.122 0.037 0.090 0.102 
1996 1,472 0.211 0.133 0.040 0.099 0.109 
1997 1,466 0.197 0.135 0.041 0.101 0.111 
1998 1,405 0.193 0.141 0.052 0.107 0.116 
1999 1,062 0.197 0.143 0.038 0.107 0.116 
2000 1,079 0.182 0.142 0.039 0.102 0.106 
2001 1,263 0.160 0.115 0.026 0.082 0.090 
2002 1,231 0.155 0.080 0.021 0.057 0.063 
2003 1,234 0.162 0.079 0.018 0.057 0.060 
2004 1,158 0.149 0.121 0.043 0.088 0.100 
2005 1,161 0.164 0.113 0.036 0.076 0.090 
2006 1,103 0.148 0.120 0.044 0.086 0.099 
2007 1,079 0.145 0.135 0.046 0.091 0.101 
2008 1,095 0.152 0.105 0.034 0.074 0.082 
2009 1,011 0.146 0.073 0.022 0.045 0.051 
2010 977 0.162 0.110 0.051 0.075 0.093 
2011 946 0.169 0.113 0.046 0.089 0.098 
2012 922 0.165 0.101 0.035 0.071 0.081 
2013 890 0.161 0.098 0.041 0.067 0.081 
2014   0.113 0.044 0.081 0.093 
Total 27,883 0.194 0.109 0.034 0.079 0.088 
continued on next page 
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Table 1 continued 
Panel B 
(1) 
Mean 
(2) 
Median 
(3) 
Minimum 
(4) 
Maximum 
(5) 
Standard 
Deviation 
(6)  
N 
DB_Cover 0.194 0 0 1 0.297 27,883 
CashFlow 0.059 0.091 –0.704 0.399 0.170 27,883 
Q 1.898 1.466 0.584 8.292 1.339 27,883 
Size 5.956 5.769 2.677 10.584 1.804 27,883 
Tang 0.241 0.209 0.015 0.717 0.158 27,883 
WC 0.145 0.141 –0.318 0.553 0.163 27,883 
Div 0.011 0 0 0.107 0.019 27,883 
CumRet 0.167 0.066 –0.809 3.179 0.634 27,883 
ΔR0At,t+2 –0.008 –0.004 –0.472 0.437 0.129 25,185 
Δ0Mt,t+2 0.006 0.002 –2.145 2.421 0.391 25,077 
ΔAT0t,t+2 –0.033 –0.010 –1.460 1.200 0.403 25,115 
ΔPen_Empt,t+2 0.186 0.047 –4.181 6.437 1.301 20,853 
As the explanatory variables are lagged by one year relative to the investment decision 
variables, the summary statistics in Panel A for DB_Cover are for the period  
1990–2013, and the summary statistics for Merger, CrossBorder, CrossIndustry, and 
CBI are for the period 1991–2014. Column 1 shows that the number of sample firms 
increases from 1990 to 1996, and then experiences abrupt drops in 1999 and 2000.12 
The number of firms picks up again in 2001, but experiences a gradual decline after 
2004. Consistent with the summary statistics documented in previous studies, columns 
2 and 3 indicate that DB-plan coverage (DB_Cover) dropped from 30.6% in 1990 to 
16.1% in 2012. 
Column 3 presents the intensity of overall merger activity. The number in each entry 
is the percentage of sample firms acquiring at least one firm in the year. On 
average, about 10.9% of the sample firms acquire at least one firm in a year. The 
overall merger activity is volatile over time, peaking at 13%–14% in 1996–2000 and 
plunging to 8% in 2002–2003 after the Internet bubble burst. Columns 4–6 report 
the intensity of merger activity by merger type. Cross-industry acquisitions are more 
than two times as popular as cross-border acquisitions on average, but the 
activities of the two types of mergers vary closely to that of the overall. This 
suggests we should control for time-fixed effects in models for investment choices. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Table 2 reports the results of the logit regressions for major investment decisions. In 
column 1, the dependent variable is a merger indicator that equals one if a firm 
acquires at least one firm in year t+1. To address the potential simultaneity issue, all 
explanatory variables are lagged one year relative to the dependent variable, or they 
are measured at year t. The result shows that higher DB-plan coverage is associated 
with a lower propensity of acquisition at a statistical significance of 5%. In terms of the 
economic magnitude, a one- standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated 
12  We checked the source document by Buessing and Soto (2006) at the Center for Retirement Research 
at Boston College, which states that for 1999 and 2000, the information of a significant number of plans 
is not available. 
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with a 0.062 reduction in odds ratio for acquisition.13 The signs of other coefficients are 
consistent with previous studies on mergers and acquisitions. Firms with stronger cash 
flow, higher valuation and better past stock returns are more likely to acquire others. 
Large firms are also more likely to be an acquirer than small firms, which probably 
reflects the fact that large firms have a larger capacity to absorb financial risks and 
stronger capability to raise external funds for acquisitions than small firms. On the other 
hand, asset tangibility is negatively related to the propensity of acquisition. A possible 
explanation is that a high level of tangible assets is generally associated with low 
growth options. Therefore, firms with high asset tangibility tend to growth internally 
rather than via acquisitions. 
In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator for large capital expenditure  
that equals one if a firm’s capital expenditure-to-assets ratio is above 90th percentile  
of the sample firms in year t+1. The result indicates that higher DB plan coverage  
is associated with a lower propensity of large capital expenditure and the result is 
statistically significant at 1% level. A one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is 
associated with a 0.244 reduction in odds ratio for making large capital expenditure. 
Consistent with column 1, firms with stronger cash flow, higher valuation and better 
past stock returns are more likely to invest in fixed assets. However, as opposed to 
column 1, large firms are less likely to invest in fixed assets than small firms, and asset 
tangibility is positively associated with the propensity of large fixed-asset investment. 
As argued above, smaller firms have weaker ability to absorb risk and raise external 
financing, so they have to rely more on fixed-asset investments for growth. The positive 
correlation between asset tangibility and large capital expenditure is consistent with our 
above argument that high asset tangibility indicates low growth options. 
Table 2: DB Plans and Major Investment Decision 
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The dependent variable is an indicator for major investment decision at t+1. In column 1, the 
indicator equals one if a firm completes at least one acquisition at t+1. In column 2, the indicator 
equals one if capital expenditure-to-assets ratio in year t+1 is above 90th percentile of sample 
firms in the year. The explanatory variables include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang,  
WC, Div, and CumRet. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and are measured as of 
time t. 
Regressions are estimated with logit. Ψ is the logistic transformation of the linear combination of 
the explanatory variables. Therefore, the probability that firm k makes major investment in year 
t+1 is modelled as, 
1
exp( )( 1 ) .
1 exp( )
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where wkt is a set of explanatory variables for firm k at year t as defined above, and β is the  
set of estimated coefficients of the model. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed 
effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
*,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
continued on next page 
13  In a logit model, the proportional impact of an increase of y for a variable Y on the odds of a positive 
outcome is estimated as exp(α×y) – 1, where α is the coefficient of Y in the model. As the coefficient of 
DB_Cover in model (1) is –0.214, the impact of a one-standard-deviation reduction in DB_Cover on the 
odds of Acquisition is exp(–0.214 × 0.297) – 1 = –0.062. 
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Table 2 continued 
 
Indicator 
(1) 
Acquisition 
(2) 
Large Capital Expenditure 
DB_Cover –0.214** –0.942*** 
 (0.095) (0.146) 
CashFlow 1.432*** 2.788*** 
 (0.210) (0.288) 
Q 0.098*** 0.382*** 
 (0.019) (0.023) 
Size 0.408*** –0.125*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) 
Tang –1.709*** 6.802*** 
 (0.215) (0.250) 
WC 0.051 –0.190 
 (0.183) (0.267) 
Div –1.426 –8.242*** 
 (1.357) (1.871) 
CumRet 0.127*** 0.272*** 
 (0.035) (0.035) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.098 0.198 
N 27,883 27,883 
Table 3 reports the results from multinomial logit regressions for investment decision. 
In particular, it aims to identify the determinants for capital expenditure versus 
acquisition decisions. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a 
firm makes neither large capital expenditure nor a merger at t+1, one (1) if a firm 
makes a large capital expenditure no mergers at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at 
least one merger at t+1. 
Column 1 reports the choices between no major investment (0) and large capital 
expenditure (1). The coefficients are close in magnitudes but in opposite signs to that 
of column 2 of Table 2. As large capital expenditure is the base case, the coefficients 
reported represent the effects of explanatory variables on the propensity of no major 
investment. Therefore, the result is consistent with that of column 2 of Table 2. 
Column 2 reports the decision between large capital expenditure (1) and 
acquisition (2). The result indicates that higher DB-plan coverage is significantly related 
with a higher propensity of acquisition rather than large capital expenditure. A  
one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.217 increase in 
odds ratio for acquisition versus large capital expenditure. Surprisingly, cash flow,  
firm valuation, and past stock return are all negatively linked with the propensity of 
acquisition versus large capital expenditure. Previous studies show that the merger 
wave is highly correlated with valuation wave because firms have strong tendency to 
issue stock to finance their mergers in high valuation for behavioral reasons (Shleifer 
and Vishny 2003; Rhodes–Kropf and Viswanathan 2004; Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, 
and Viswanathan 2005). It turns out that the correlation between capital expenditure 
and valuation overshadows the correlation between acquisition and valuation. 
Consistent with Table 2, more tangible assets are related with more capital expenditure 
and fewer acquisitions. 
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Table 3: DB Plans and the Choice between Capital Expenditure and Mergers 
The dependent variable is an indicator (InvType) that equals zero (0) if a firm neither makes 
large capital expenditure nor completes an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a large 
capital expenditure but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes 
at least one acquisition at t+1. A capital expenditure is large if the capital expenditure-to-assets 
ratio is above 90th percentile of the sample firms in the year. 
All explanatory variables are measured as of time t. Regression models are estimated with 
multinomial logit, with case (1) as the base case. The probability that firm k choose j in year t+1 
is modelled as, 
1
0
exp( )
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wkt is a set of explanatory variables for firm k at year t, which include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, 
Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet, as defined in Table 1. βj is the set of estimated coefficients 
for choice j. As case (1) is the base case, the set of coefficients β1 are set to zeros. 
Result for case (0) versus case (1) is reported in column 1, result for case (2) versus case (1) is 
reported in column 2. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not 
reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 
1% significant levels, respectively. 
 (1) 
No Major Investment (0) vs 
Large CAPX (1, Base) 
(2) 
Acquisition (2) vs  
Large CAPX (1, Base) 
DB_Cover 0.959*** 0.661*** 
 (0.149) (0.168) 
CashFlow –2.775*** –1.071*** 
 (0.293) (0.340) 
Q –0.389*** –0.232*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) 
Size 0.122*** 0.518*** 
 (0.028) (0.032) 
Tang –6.626*** –7.555*** 
 (0.248) (0.302) 
WC 0.278 0.267 
 (0.273) (0.305) 
Div 7.053*** 4.332** 
 (1.874) (2.151) 
CumRet –0.273*** –0.106** 
 (0.036) (0.047) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.143 
N 27,883 
Table 4, Panel A examines the impact of DB plan coverage on the choices of mergers. 
Column 1 reports the multinomial logit regression for the decision between  
cross-border acquisition and domestic acquisition. The dependent variable is an 
indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not complete any mergers at t+1, one (1) if a 
firm completes at least one domestic merger but no cross-border merger at t+1, and 
two (2) if a firm completes at least one cross-border merger at t+1. Result for case (2) 
versus case (1) is reported. It indicates that higher DB plan coverage is significantly 
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related with a higher propensity of cross-border versus domestic acquisition. A  
one-standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.135 increase in 
odds ratio for cross-border versus domestic acquisition. 
Column 2 reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between cross- 
industry acquisition (2) and horizontal acquisition (1). The result indicates that higher 
DB plan coverage is associated with a higher propensity of cross-industry versus 
horizontal acquisition, and the result is statistically significant at 5% level. A one-
standard-deviation increase in DB_Cover is associated with a 0.134 increase in odds 
ratio for cross-industry versus horizontal acquisition. Column 3 combines the cases in 
columns 1 and 2 and examines the decision between cross-border or cross-industry 
(i.e., diversifying) acquisition (2) and domestic horizontal (i.e., non-diversifying) 
acquisition (1). The results are qualitative the same as those reported in columns 1 and 
2. DB-plan coverage is positively associated with the propensity of acquiring foreign 
firms or firms in other industries. The economic magnitude is that a one-standard-
deviation increase in DB-plan coverage is associated with an increase of 0.184 in odds 
ratio of diversifying acquisition versus non-diversifying acquisition. 
Table 4, Panel B examines the impact of DB plan coverage on the type of investment. 
The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does not make any 
large capital expenditure or acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm makes a large capital 
expenditure but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, two (2) if a firm completes at 
least one non-diversifying acquisition but no diversifying acquisition at t+1, and three 
(3) if a firm completes at least one diversifying acquisition at t+1. 
Column 1 reports the decision between non-diversifying acquisition (2) and large 
capital expenditure (1), and column 2 reports the decision between diversifying 
acquisition (2) and large capital expenditure (1). The result indicates that DB-plan 
coverage has a statistically insignificant impact on the decision between non-
diversifying acquisition and large capital expenditure, while it is positively related to the 
propensity of diversifying acquisition versus large capital expenditure. A possible 
explanation for the difference is that both capital expenditure and non-diversifying 
acquisition are mainly for expanding local production facilities. As a result, the choice 
between the two should not result in a significant difference in labor bargaining power 
and financial risk. On the other hand, a diversifying acquisition allows the acquirer to 
stay further away from labor power in its core business or to diversify its financial risk. 
Therefore, firms with stronger DB-plan coverage are inclined to acquire foreign firms or 
firms in other industries. 
Although the results above could suggest that firms stay away from labor power by 
acquiring firms abroad or in other industries, it is also possible that firms maintain DB 
plans in order to gain support from existing employees and labor unions for their 
investment plans. For example, foreseeing weakening bargaining power as a result of 
diversifying acquisitions, existing employees and labor unions may strongly oppose the 
investments unless they get the employers’ guarantee of keeping employees’ benefits 
untouched. There are two potential ways to gain support from labor unions. First, firms 
can pre-commit not to reduce employees’ benefits after acquisition. Second, firms can 
invest in countries or industries with strong presence of unionized workforce as a signal 
to respect the collective bargaining rights. 
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Table 4: DB Plans and Type of Acquisition 
Panel A reports the multinomial logit regressions for the choice between different types of 
acquisition. In column 1, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a firm does 
not complete an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one domestic acquisition 
but no cross-border acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one cross-border 
acquisition at t+1. In column 2, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a 
firm does not complete an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one horizontal 
acquisition but no cross-industry acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one 
cross-industry acquisition at t+1. In column 3, the dependent variable is an indicator that equals 
zero (0) if a firm does not complete an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm completes at least one 
domestic horizontal (i.e., non-diversifying) acquisition but no cross-border or cross-industry (i.e., 
diversifying) acquisition at t+1, and two (2) if a firm completes at least one cross-border or 
cross-industry acquisition at t+1. Case (1) as the base case. Result for case (2) versus case (1) 
is reported. 
Panel B reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between large capital expenditure 
and different types of acquisition. The dependent variable is an indicator that equals zero (0) if a 
firm neither makes large capital expenditure nor completes an acquisition at t+1, one (1) if a firm 
makes a large capital expenditure but does not complete an acquisition at t+1, two (2) if a firm 
completes at least one non-diversifying acquisition but no diversifying acquisition at t+1, and 
three (3) if a firm completes at least one diversifying acquisition at t+1. Case (1) as the base 
case. Result for case (2) versus case (1) is reported in column 1 and result for case (3) versus 
case (1) is reported in column 2. 
The explanatory variables include DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet. 
All explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and are measured as of time t. Year fixed 
effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are 
reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5% ,and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
Panel A 
(1) 
Cross-border (2) vs 
Domestic (1, base) 
(2) 
Cross-industry (2) vs 
Horizontal (1, Base) 
(3) 
Diversifying (2) vs 
Non-diversifying  
(1, Base) 
DB_Cover 0.425** 0.424** 0.568** 
 (0.171) (0.192) (0.230) 
CashFlow –0.292 0.202 0.190 
 (0.405) (0.378) (0.416) 
Q 0.003 –0.008 –0.015 
 (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) 
Size 0.208*** 0.089*** 0.139*** 
 (0.031) (0.032) (0.034) 
Tang 1.018** –1.082*** –1.002** 
 (0.419) (0.412) (0.457) 
WC 1.201*** 0.963*** 1.167*** 
 (0.348) (0.355) (0.379) 
Div –1.768 2.201 3.537 
 (2.564) (3.005) (3.109) 
CumRet 0.137** 0.010 0.046 
 (0.069) (0.072) (0.082) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.093 0.089 0.094 
N 27,883 27,883 27,883 
continued on next page 
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Table 4 continued 
Panel B 
(1) 
Non-diversifying (2) vs  
Large CAPX (1, Base) 
(2) 
Diversifying (3) vs  
Large CAPX (1, Base)` 
DB_Cover 0.179 0.762*** 
 (0.251) (0.174) 
CashFlow –1.123** –0.986*** 
 (0.460) (0.357) 
Q –0.218*** –0.239*** 
 (0.035) (0.028) 
Size 0.407*** 0.548*** 
 (0.042) (0.033) 
Tang –6.655*** –7.791*** 
 (0.493) (0.312) 
WC –0.661 0.530* 
 (0.429) (0.314) 
Div 1.333 5.102** 
 (3.386) (2.215) 
CumRet –0.136* –0.097** 
 (0.081) (0.049) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.136 
N 27,883 
Tables 5 and 6 disentangle the bargaining motive from the conforming motive of DB 
plan sponsoring firms who engage in diversifying acquisitions. If firms intentionally 
reduce labor bargaining power by acquiring firms abroad or in other industries, we 
should observe greater benefits accrued to firms where the labor power proxied by  
DB-plan coverage is stronger. This prediction is supported by Rose (1991)’s finding 
that compared with focused firms, diversified firms can endure longer labor strikes and 
therefore reduce wage settlements. Besides, DB plan sponsoring firms would invest 
mainly in countries or industries with weak presence of labor unions, and they are more 
likely to reduce costs including labor costs after acquisition. In contrast, although the 
conforming view also predicts that DB plan sponsoring firms are more likely to invest 
abroad and other industries to reduce financial risks than non-sponsoring firms, it 
suggests that those firms are more likely invest in countries and industries with strong 
unionized workforce and less likely to reduce labor benefits after acquisition. 
Empirically, we regress changes of the performance variables on the indicators  
of major investments. The performance variables include: (1) ΔR0At,t+2, change in 
earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets, from t 
to t+2; (2) Δ0Mt,t+2, change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled 
by net sales, from t to t+2; (3) ΔAT0t,t+2, where ATO is net sales scaled by lagged  
total assets; and (4) ΔPen_Empt,t+2 where Pen_Emp is the pension and retirement 
expense scaled by number of employees (in thousands of dollars). Indicators of major 
investments include: (1) an indicator that equals one if a firm makes a large capital 
expenditure or non-diversifying acquisition (Local); (2) CBI as defined above. We 
combine large capital expenditure and non-diversifying acquisitions into a group 
because Table 4 shows that DB_Cover does not affect the choice between the two. 
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Besides, we interact the investment indicators with DB_Cover to examine if the benefit 
from a particular type of investment is greater for firms with higher DB plan coverage. 
We run the following ordinary least squares (OLS) model regression for the change in 
operating performance: 
, 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
1 3 1 4 4 , 2
2013 39
, , , ,1991 21
_ _
_
2
t t t a t t t
t a t t t a t t
yr i i t ind j j t ti j
Performance Local CBI DB Cover DB Cover
Local DB Cover CBI Firm Firm
Yrdum SIC
β β β β β
β β β
β β ε
+ + +
+ + +
= =
∆ = + + + + ×
′ ′+ × + + ∆ +
+ +∑ ∑
 (1) 
The dependent variable, ΔPerformancet,t+2, is one of ΔR0At,t+2, Δ0Mt,t+2, ΔAT0t,t+2, and 
ΔPen_Empt,t+2, as defined above. Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, 
Size, Tang, WC and Div as defined in Table 1, in year t. ΔFirm is the change in firm 
characteristics (Firm) from t to t+2. Note that CashFlow is not included because it is 
highly correlated with R0A. We include ΔFirm in the regressions to control for changes 
in firm policies that are unrelated to the investment decisions but affect change in firm 
performance. Nevertheless, we report results with and without ΔFirm in Panel A and 
Panel B of Table 5. 
Panel A shows that without a major investment, DB plan coverage has a positive  
and significant effect on firm performance. This suggests DB pension plans do not 
negatively affect firm performance. However, large capital expenditures or non-
diversifying acquisitions negatively affect firms’ performance, especially for firms with 
high DB-plan coverage (column 1) as indicated by the negative coefficient of the 
interaction term. To further investigate change in return on assets (ΔR0At,t+2), we use 
change in operating profit margin (Δ0Mt,t+2), change in asset turnover (ΔAT0t,t+2),  
and change in fixed asset to employee ratio (ΔPen_Empt,t+2) as dependent variables  
in columns 2, 3 and 4 respectively.14 The regression results show that all operating  
profit margin declines, after such investments especially for firms with higher DB  
plan coverage. Besides, pension expense per employee for firms with high DB plan 
coverage increases. Therefore, large capital expenditures and non-diversifying 
acquisitions seem to destroy value for DB plan sponsoring firms by reducing both  
their operating efficiency and ability to cut costs. The finding is consistent with the 
bargaining motive of DB plan sponsoring firms. The new investments in local and 
existing businesses expose more firm assets to unionized workforce, making firms 
difficult to improve profitability by reducing costs. As a result, DB plan sponsoring firms 
tend to avoid investing in existing businesses locally. 
While diversifying acquisitions also result in worse operating profitability (column 1),  
the effect is less negative for firms with higher DB-plan coverage. The finding suggests 
that diversifying acquisitions create more value for DB plan sponsoring firms than  
non-sponsoring firms. Columns 2, 3 and 4 show that the relative outperformance of DB 
plan sponsoring firms is mainly due to an improvement in asset turnover. On the other 
hand, there is no indication that those firms reduce operating expense after investing 
abroad or other industries, as suggested by insignificant coefficients of the interaction 
term in regressions for Δ0Mt,t+2 and ΔPen_Empt,t+2. Therefore, cutting costs is unlikely 
to be a major motivation for DB plan sponsoring firms to invest abroad or in new 
industries, which is inconsistent with the bargaining motive but consistent with the 
conforming motive. 
  
14  Notice that ROA = OM × ATO. 
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Table 5: The Effects of Large Capital Expenditures and Domestic Horizontal 
Acquisitions on Operating Performance 
, 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
1 3 1 4 4 , 2
2013 39
, , , ,1991 21
_ _
_
2
t t t a t t t
t a t t t a t t
yr i i t ind j j t ti j
Performance Local CBI DB Cover DB Cover
Local DB Cover CBI Firm Firm
Yrdum SIC
β β β β β
β β β
β β ε
+ + +
+ + +
= =
∆ = + + + + ×
′ ′+ × + + ∆ +
+ +∑ ∑
 
The dependent variable, ∆Performancet,t+2, is one of the following variables. ΔR0At,t+2 is change 
in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by lagged total assets, from t to t+2; 
Δ0Mt,t+2 is change in earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation, scaled by net sales, from  
t to t+2; ∆AT0t,t+2 is the change in net sales scaled by lagged total assets from t to t+2; and 
∆Pen_Empt,t+2 is the change in pension and retirement expense scaled by number of employees 
(in thousands of dollars per employee). 
Regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) method. Local is an indicator for 
large capital expenditure or non-diversifying acquisition, and CBI is an indicator for diversifying 
acquisition. Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, Size, Tang, WC and Div as 
defined in Table 1, in year t. ΔFirm is the change in Firm from t to t+2. Year fixed effects and  
2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in 
the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively 
Panel A 
(1) 
∆R0A 
(2) 
∆0M 
(3) 
∆AT0 
(4) 
∆Pen_Emp 
Local –0.017*** 0.005 –0.108*** 0.028 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.010) (0.027) 
CBI –0.013*** –0.005 –0.048*** –0.134*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.033) 
DB Cover 0.010*** 0.012** 0.013 0.164*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.009) (0.042) 
Local×DB Cover –0.016** –0.034** –0.031 0.208* 
 (0.008) (0.014) (0.028) (0.120) 
CBI×DB Cover 0.017** 0.013 0.070*** –0.175 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.120) 
Q –0.003*** 0.015*** –0.023*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) 
Size –0.003*** –0.006*** –0.021*** 0.041*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Tang 0.058*** 0.055** 0.204*** –0.071 
 (0.007) (0.024) (0.020) (0.081) 
WC –0.075*** –0.133*** –0.263*** 0.083 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.020) (0.064) 
Div –0.071 –0.390*** –0.066 0.733 
 (0.049) (0.139) (0.148) (0.522) 
CumRet –0.011*** –0.034*** –0.080*** 0.023 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.015) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R–sq 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.05 
N 25,185 25,077 25,115 20,853 
continued on next page 
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Table 5 continued 
Panel B 
(1) 
∆R0A 
(2) 
∆0M 
(3) 
∆AT0 
(4) 
∆Pen_Emp 
Local –0.023*** –0.004 –0.124*** 0.101*** 
 (0.003) (0.010) (0.010) (0.030) 
CBI –0.026*** –0.015 –0.068*** –0.108*** 
 (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.034) 
DB Cover 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.024*** 0.168*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.009) (0.042) 
Local×DB Cover –0.012* –0.031** –0.025 0.188 
 (0.007) (0.014) (0.028) (0.121) 
CBI×DB Cover 0.023*** 0.019 0.078*** –0.194 
 (0.007) (0.015) (0.026) (0.120) 
ΔQ 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.090*** –0.021** 
 (0.001) (0.006) (0.003) (0.009) 
ΔSize 0.074*** 0.062*** 0.149*** –0.178*** 
 (0.004) (0.013) (0.010) (0.033) 
ΔTang –0.132*** –0.023 –0.071 –0.823*** 
 (0.017) (0.070) (0.051) (0.204) 
ΔWC 0.130*** 0.156*** 0.302*** –0.186** 
 (0.010) (0.036) (0.027) (0.078) 
ΔDiv –0.078 –0.074 0.040 0.265 
 (0.048) (0.156) (0.102) (0.253) 
Q 0.002 0.023*** –0.002 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.005) (0.003) (0.009) 
Size –0.002*** –0.005** –0.018*** 0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.007) 
Tang 0.037*** 0.049* 0.200*** –0.200** 
 (0.007) (0.025) (0.020) (0.086) 
WC –0.037*** –0.086*** –0.148*** 0.055 
 (0.007) (0.027) (0.021) (0.067) 
Div –0.161*** –0.515*** –0.243 0.886* 
 (0.050) (0.155) (0.149) (0.525) 
CumRet –0.013*** –0.035*** –0.076*** 0.036** 
 (0.002) (0.006) (0.005) (0.016) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.16 0.02 0.17 0.05 
N 24,488 24,388 24,400 20,783 
In Panel B, we include ΔFirm in the model. The main results are qualitatively the same 
as those in Panel A, except that the interaction term Local×DB_Cover becomes 
statistically insignificant in the regression for ΔPen_Empt,t+2. 
Table 6 examines the target location of diversifying acquisition and target industry in 
diversifying acquisition. The bargaining motive suggests DB plan sponsoring firms 
invest in countries or industries with weak unionized workforce while the conforming 
motive suggests the opposite. To test the two predictions, we first identify the union 
power of target country in each cross-border acquisition and that of target industry in 
each domestic diversifying acquisition. To gauge country-level union power, we obtain 
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the collective relations law index developed by Botero et al. (2004), a composite index 
of eighteen indicators that measure labor union power and the rights of collective 
disputes. Industry union power is gauged by the industry unionization rate provided by 
Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson. Then for each firm-year, we calculate the average 
collective relations law index for target countries of all cross-border acquisitions 
(Avg_cUnion) and the average unionization rate for target industries of all domestic 
diversifying acquisitions (Avg_iUnion) done by the firm, if any. 
Table 6: Choice of Locations in Cross-border Acquisitions  
and Industries in Diversifying Acquisitions 
1 1 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
2013 39
, , , ,1991 21
_ (  _ ) _
2
t t t t t
t t t t t
yr i i t ind j j t ti j
Avg cUnion or Avg iUnion DB Cover CashFlow Q
Size Tang WC Div CumRet
Yrdum SIC
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε
+ +
= =
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ +∑ ∑
 
The dependent variables are average collective relations law index of target countries 
(Avg_cUnion, column 1) and average industry unionization rate (Avg_iUnion, column 2). The 
collective relations law index is provided by Botero et al. (2004) and the industry unionization 
rate is provided by Barry Hirsch and David Macpherson. For each firm-year, we calculate the 
average collective relations law index for target countries of all cross-border acquisitions and the 
average unionization rate for target industries of all cross-industry acquisitions, if any. Other 
explanatory variables are defined in Table 1 and measured as of time t. 
Regressions are estimated with ordinary least squares (OLS) model. For column 1, only firms 
that acquire foreign firms are included, and for column 2, only firms that make cross-industry 
acquisitions in the domestic market. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry fixed effects are 
added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** represent 
10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
 (1) 
Avg_cUnion 
(2) 
Avg_iUnion 
DB_Cover 0.051** 0.025*** 
 (0.023) (0.009) 
CashFlow –0.016 –0.010 
 (0.054) (0.019) 
Q 0.005 –0.004*** 
 (0.005) (0.001) 
Size 0.006 –0.002* 
 (0.004) (0.001) 
Tang 0.103** 0.111*** 
 (0.050) (0.021) 
WC 0.012 0.011 
 (0.056) (0.018) 
Div 0.289 –0.118 
 (0.363) (0.106) 
CumRet –0.009 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.003) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes 
Adj. R-sq 0.04 0.22 
N 951 1,629 
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We run the following OLS regressions for Avg_cUnion (column 1) and Avg_iUnion 
(column 2): 
1 1 0 1 2 3
4 5 6 7 8
2013 39
, , , ,1991 21
_ (  _ ) _
2
t t t t t
t t t t t
yr i i t ind j j t ti j
Avg cUnion or Avg iUnion DB Cover CashFlow Q
Size Tang WC Div CumRet
Yrdum SIC
γ γ γ γ
γ γ γ γ γ
γ γ ε
+ +
= =
= + + + +
+ + + + +
+ +∑ ∑
 (2) 
By construction, for column 1, only firms that acquire at least on foreign firm in a year 
are considered, while for column 2, only firms that make at least one domestic 
diversifying acquisition in a year are considered. As a result, the numbers of 
observations are much lower than those for previous tables. 
The regression results suggest that firms with higher DB plan coverage generally prefer 
investing in countries or industries with stronger unionized workforce, as indicated by 
the positive coefficients of DB_Cover in both regressions. The finding is in line with the 
conformity motive of DB plan sponsoring firms who consider employees’ benefits and 
concerns in their investment decisions. However, it is inconsistent with the bargaining 
motive that predicts firms to strategically reallocate their capital to areas outside the 
scrutiny of labor unions.  
In sum, the results in Tables 5 and 6 show that DB plan sponsoring firms experience 
an improvement in operating profitability relative to non-sponsoring firms after 
diversifying acquisitions. However, such improvement is not due to cost cutting or 
reduction in pension expense but an improvement in asset turnover. Further analysis 
shows that in cross-border or domestic diversifying acquisitions, DB plan sponsoring 
firms tend to invest in countries or industries with strong union power. All these  
findings are consistent with the conforming motive but against the bargaining motive of 
firms in their investment decisions. At the same time, we do find some supporting 
evidence for the bargaining motive of DB plan sponsoring firms in their capital 
expenditure and non-diversifying acquisition decisions. After those investments, DB 
plan sponsoring firms experience a reduction in operating profitability and an increase 
in pension expense relative to non-sponsoring firms. The finding can explain why DB 
plan sponsoring firms tend to under-invest in existing businesses especially in the 
domestic market. 
5. FURTHER DISCUSSIONS  
AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
5.1 Relation with Other Studies in Cross-border Acquisitions 
and Additional Controls for Investment Choice 
Previous studies for cross-border mergers have identified country-levels and industry-
level factors that are not included in our baseline models. Many studies suggest that a 
spill- over of good governance standards from the bidder to the target creates value. 
For example, Rossi and Volpin (2004) find that countries with better accounting 
standards and stronger shareholder protection have more M&A activities, and that 
cross-border mergers are mostly initiated by firms in countries with better investor 
protection to acquire firms in countries with weaker investor protection. Martynova and 
Renneboog (2008) show that takeover returns are positively related to the difference 
between the bidder and target country-level corporate governance. Bris, Brisley, and 
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Cabolis (2008) find that industry valuation increases when firms in the industry are 
acquired by firms in other countries with better investor protection and accounting 
standards. Bris and Cabolis (2008) find that bidders from countries with better 
shareholder protection and accounting standards pay a higher merger premium in 
cross-border mergers relative to matching domestic mergers. Lel and Miller (2015) 
document that after a country passes a takeover law, poorly performing firms 
experience a higher probability of being taken over. 
Taxation is another consideration when firms choose between domestic and cross-
border acquisitions. Scholes and Wolfson (1990) show that the Tax Reform Act of  
1986 that discourages tax-induced M&A activity reduces domestic M&A activity but 
increases the demand for foreign acquisitions. Huizinga and Voget (2009) show that 
double taxation of foreign subsidiaries’ income reduces the incentives to acquire 
foreign firms. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) find that cross-border mergers are likely 
to happen if the tax rate in the bidder’s country is higher than that of the target’s 
country. Geographic and cultural distances also affect M&A activity between two 
countries. Erel, Liao, and Weisbach (2012) show cross- border mergers are more likely 
to happen between two countries if the two countries are geographically close to each 
other and they have more bilateral trades. Ahern, Daminelli, and Fracassi (2015) show 
that M&A activity between two countries is more intensive if they are culturally close in 
terms of trust, hierarchy and individualism. Besides, greater distances in trust and 
individualism result in lower combined merger announcement returns. 
However, as our study assesses US firms’ investment decisions, we cannot include 
those country-level factors in our analysis. Instead, we create several industry-level  
or firm- level substitutes to address some of those issues. First, we control for  
cross-border trades at industry-level. We collect import and export values at 
Harmonized System (HS) level from Peter Schott’s website in 1990–2012, aggregate 
the HS product-level values into industry- level levels, and calculate the industry’s 
share of import (export) in a year as its import (export) value divided by the total import 
(export) value of all industries in the year.15 We expect an industry’s demand for cross-
border acquisitions are correlated with its international trade volume. 
Second, we collect firm-level after-interest marginal tax rates by Blouin, Core, and 
Guay (2010). Foley et al. (2007) document that many firms hold excess cash abroad 
because of facing high repatriation taxes on their foreign incomes. Therefore, we 
expect firms facing higher marginal tax rates on their incomes to be more likely to 
explore foreign opportunities for reducing their tax expenses. 
Third, we include the yearly intensity of cross-border (diversifying) acquisitions  
at industry level, defined as the number of cross-border (diversifying) acquisitions 
divided by the total number of acquisitions in the industry. The two variables control for 
unknown industry factors that drive the differences in cross-border and diversifying 
acquisitions across industries. Besides, Clougherty et al. (2014) theoretically and 
empirically show that more cross-border mergers in a highly unionized industry, 
particularly those involve firms in same industry, result in lower wages for rival firms. 
Therefore, we include the variables in both the choice model and the models for 
changes in pension expense and operating performance. 
 
15  The data is available at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/peterschott/sub_international.htm and it is funded by 
Yale Social Sciences Library. We thank Peter Schott to make it available free for academic use. See 
Pierce and Schott (2012) for detailed documentation of concordance between HS System codes and 
SIC/NAICS codes. 
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Fourth, we include institutional ownership to account for the degree of institutional 
monitoring. Ferreira, Massa, and Matos (2010) find that foreign institutional ownership 
increases the completion rate of cross-border acquisition and they argue that foreign 
institutions help reduce the information asymmetry between bidders and targets. As US 
institutions are supposed to be sophisticated in collecting and processing information, 
we expect that a higher level of institutional ownership should increase a firm’s 
probability to acquire a foreign firm. However, previous studies also suggest that  
short-termism of institutional investors lead to managerial short-termism, resulting in 
distorted corporate decisions. For example, Bushee (1998) finds that short-term 
institutional holding causes corporate managers to engage less in research and 
development that provides long-term benefits but results in short-term downward 
pressure on earnings. Gaspar, Massa, and Matos (2005) find that target firms with 
short-term institutional investors are likely to get lower premiums. They attribute the 
finding to weak monitoring from short-term investors that allow managers to seek 
private benefits rather than maximize proceeds from acquisitions. Similarly, Chen, 
Harford, and Li (2007) find that independent long-term institutional holding is positively 
related to post-merger stock performance and operating performance. To calculate 
short-term and long-term institutional holdings, we use investor classification by Brian 
Bushee to classify institutional investors into dedicated investors, quasi-indexers, and 
transient investors.16 We then obtain institutional holding data from Thomson Reuters 
Institutional (13f) Holdings. Dedicated (Transient) ownership for each quarter is the 
number of shares held by dedicated (transient) investors divided by the total number of 
shares outstanding at the end of quarter. We then average the quarterly measures into 
annual ones. 
Finally, we include pension deficits, defined as pension benefit obligation minus fair 
value of pension plan assets, scaled by lagged total assets. Previous studies (Rauh 
2006; Chang, Kang, and Zhang 2012; Cocco and Volpin 2013) show that pension 
deficits significantly affect investment decisions. 
Table 7 reports the results with additional controls. As the import/export data is 
available up to 2012 only and some of the variables have missing values for some 
firms or industries, the numbers of observations are lower than those reported in 
previous tables. Panel A reports the result from multinomial model for investment 
choices. The model is specified similarly to that for Panel B of Table 4, with additional 
control variables added. As reported above, the result indicates that after controlling for 
industry’s international trading activity, cross-border and diversifying acquisition activity 
as well as firm’s tax rate and institutional ownership, DB plan coverage is still 
negatively related to the propensity of making a major investment (column 1). Besides, 
conditional to a major investment, firms are more likely to acquire firms abroad or in 
other industries than to invest in fixed assets or acquire a domestic firm in same 
industry (columns 2 and 3). Therefore, our main results in Table 4 are robust to the 
presence of additional controls. 
  
16  The classification data is available at http://acct.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/IIclass.html. We 
thank Brian Bushee for making the data available free for academic use. 
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Table 7: Robustness Check: DB Plan Coverage and Investment Choice 
The table reports the multinomial logit regression for the choice between large capital 
expenditure and different types of acquisitions. Industry’s share of import (export) is defined as 
its import (export) value divided by the total import (export) value. After-interest marginal tax rate 
comes from Blouin, Core and Guay (2010). Intensity of cross-border (cross-industry) 
acquisitions is the number of cross-border (cross-industry) acquisitions divided by the total 
number of acquisitions in the industry. Dedicated (Transient) ownership is the number of shares 
held by dedicated (transient) investors divided by the total number of shares outstanding. 
Pension deficits is pension benefit obligation minus fair value of pension plan assets, scaled  
by lagged total assets. A firm’s pension deficits is set to be zero if it has no pension data 
reported by Compustat. DB_Cover, CashFlow, Q, Size, Tang, WC, Div, and CumRet are 
defined in Table 1 and are measured as of time t. Year fixed effects and 2-digit SIC industry 
fixed effects are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. 
*,**,*** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
Investment Choice 
(1) 
No major investment (0) 
vs Large CAPX  
(1, Base) 
(2) 
Non-diversifying (2) 
vs large CAPX  
(1, base) 
(3) 
Diversifying (3) vs 
Large CAPX (1, Base) 
DB_Cover 0.874*** 0.285 0.765*** 
 (0.158) (0.268) (0.184) 
CashFlow –1.880*** –1.007* –0.607 
 (0.316) (0.515) (0.399) 
Q –0.351*** –0.211*** –0.202*** 
 (0.025) (0.038) (0.031) 
Size 0.214*** 0.442*** 0.617*** 
 (0.036) (0.053) (0.042) 
Tang –6.831*** –7.068*** –8.008*** 
 (0.261) (0.533) (0.337) 
WC 0.342 –0.404 0.472 
 (0.307) (0.481) (0.351) 
Div 4.896** 1.012 3.474 
 (2.019) (3.666) (2.508) 
CumRet –0.285*** –0.199** –0.115** 
 (0.039) (0.086) (0.053) 
Pension deficits 0.413 –1.352 0.316 
 (0.839) (1.335) (1.033) 
Industry’s share of import –4.433 –16.014* –0.210 
 (4.480) (9.487) (5.083) 
Industry’s share of export –9.212** 19.818** –11.253** 
 (4.493) (7.929) (5.036) 
After–interest marginal 
tax rate 
–1.900*** –0.102 –0.840 
(0.454) (0.817) (0.586) 
Intensity of cross-border 
acquisitions 
0.652*** 0.138 0.996*** 
(0.246) (0.519) (0.313) 
Intensity of cross-industry 
acquisitions 
–0.220 –1.487*** 0.238 
(0.188) (0.355) (0.272) 
Dedicated ownership 0.067 –0.019 –0.954* 
 (0.426) (0.774) (0.533) 
Transient ownership –2.127*** –0.430 –1.048** 
 (0.362) (0.599) (0.464) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Pseudo R-sq 0.144 
N 24,364 
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5.2 Endogeneity of DB Plan Coverage 
This subsection aims to account for endogeneity concerns. For example, technological 
development may affect a firm’s relationship with labor unions as well as its investment 
opportunity set. While a firm’s technological development can enlarge its investment 
opportunities by allowing it to expand its production capacity, it may also reduce its 
reliance on labor forces and its incentives to provide DB pension plans to retain 
workers. Similar effects exist when trade agreements are set up to reduce barriers to 
trade. Trade liberalization provides more economic motivations for cross-border 
investments but trade agreements also affect firms’ incentives to retain workers and 
reduce the power of labor unions. Without controlling those unobserved firm-specific  
or market-wide heterogeneous factors, the estimation results might be biased  
and inconsistent. 
To address the endogeneity concern for the relationship between DB plan coverage 
and change in operating performance after major investments, we re-run models for 
Table 5 Panel B using instrumental variable (IV) regressions. We further add firm  
fixed effects to the regressions to control for omitted time-invariant firm characteristics 
that could cause a spurious relation between DB plan coverage and firm performance. 
Adding firm fixed effects to the regressions can also control for firm-specific factors  
that affect the investment choices, as Table 4 shows that firms making one form  
of investment may be fundamentally different from firms making another form  
of investment. 
We perform the IV regressions with the following instruments: (1) the industry 
unionization rate; (2) the 5-year lagged value of the natural logarithm pension and 
postretirement expenses per employee, which is motivated by Bae, Kang, and Wang 
(2011) who use it as an instrument for employee treatment index; and (3) the 5-year 
lagged value of the natural logarithm of number of employees. We expect lagged 
values of labor related variables are good instruments for current DB plan coverage for 
the following reason. Although a firm’s investment decision could be affected by its 
existing labor policies, it is much less likely that it could be affected by its labor policies 
long time ago. Therefore, it is unlikely that a firm’s labor policies a long time ago affect 
its current investment decision beyond the correlation between past and current 
pension policies. The industry unionization rate is used as an instrument because labor 
unions are found to be associated with DB pension plans and many DB plans were 
collectively bargained when labor unions were strong. It is the most widely used proxy 
for labor bargaining power in previous studies (e.g., Klasa, Maxwell, and Ortiz–Molina 
2009; Matsa 2010; Shivdasani and Stefanescu 2010; Chang, Kang, and Zhang 2012). 
Simple correlation analysis shows that the correlations between DB_cover and those 
instrumental variables are between 0.05 and 0.44 and significant at 1% level. 
Table 8 reports the IV regression results for change in performance with DB plan 
coverage and its interaction with indicator for cross-border or diversifying acquisitions 
instrumented. The instruments include those listed above and their interaction with 
Local and CBI. The J-statistics of all models except the last column are statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that our IV models are well-specified. The IV regression 
results are generally consistent with those of the OLS regressions, except that the 
coefficients of Local×DB_Cover are still negative but insignificant for the regressions of 
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ΔR0At,t+2 and Δ0Mt,t+2, while the coefficients of Local×DB_Cover and CBI×DB_Cover 
become statistically significant for the regression of ΔPen_Empt,t+2.17 
Table 8: Robustness Check: Instrumental Variable Model  
for Change in Operating Performance 
A two-stage firm fixed-effects model is estimated for change in performance from year t to t+2. 
In first stage DB_Covert, DB_Covert × Localt+1, and DB_Covert × CBIt+1 are respectively 
regressed on (1) industry unionization rate, (2) the 5-year lagged value of pension and 
postretirement expenses per employee, (3) the 5-year lagged value of the natural logarithm of 
number of employees, and their interaction terms with Local and CBI, together with other 
exogenous variables and year dummies. The predicted values of the three variables are then 
included in the second-stage regression as follows: 
, 2 0 1 1 1 1 2 3
1 3 1 4
2013
4 , 2 , ,1991
. _ .
( _ ) .( _ )
  
t t t a t t
t t a t t t
a t t yr i i t ti
Performance Local CBI Inst DB Cover Inst
DB Cover Local Inst DB Cover CBI Firm
Firm Yrdum Firm fixed effects
β β β β β
β β
β β ε
+ + +
+ +
+ =
∆ = + + + +
′× + × + +
′ ∆ + + +∑
 
Firm is a vector of firm characteristics including Q, Size, Tang, WC and Div as defined in Table 
1, in year t. ΔFirm is the change in Firm from t to t+2. Year-fixed effects and firm-fixed effects 
are added but not reported. The standard errors are reported in the parentheses. *,**,*** 
represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant levels, respectively. 
 (1) 
∆R0A 
(2) 
∆0M 
(3) 
∆AT0 
(4) 
∆Pen_Emp 
Local –0.005 0.030* –0.083* –0.089 
 (0.011) (0.018) (0.044) (0.098) 
CBI –0.047*** –0.023 –0.134** 0.074 
 (0.014) (0.022) (0.052) (0.120) 
DB_Cover 1.395*** 1.133** 5.538*** –8.539*** 
 (0.360) (0.565) (1.378) (3.181) 
Local × DB_Cover –0.030 –0.094 –0.025 0.743** 
 (0.041) (0.064) (0.157) (0.344) 
CBI × DB_Cover 0.139*** 0.088 0.448** –0.961** 
 (0.046) (0.072) (0.176) (0.398) 
ΔQ 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.106*** –0.071*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.025) 
ΔSize 0.069*** 0.046*** 0.193*** –0.345*** 
 (0.007) (0.012) (0.028) (0.063) 
ΔTang –0.053 –0.004 0.342** –1.571*** 
 (0.040) (0.063) (0.153) (0.343) 
continued on next page 
17  A potential concern for using industry unionization rate as an instrument is that industry unionization 
rate is found to be correlated with corporate financing decisions (Matsa 2010) and cash holding (Klasa, 
Maxwell, and Ortiz–Molina 2009) by previous studies. It is possible that industry unionization rate also 
affects change in operating performance directly rather than via DB plan coverage. In an unreported 
test, we re-run regressions for Table 5 Panel B with industry unionization rate and firm-fixed effects. We 
found that industry unionization rate is uncorrelated with ΔROAt,t+2, ΔOMt,t+2 and ΔATOt,t+2, but it is 
negatively correlated with ΔPen_Empt,t+2. In other words, industry unionization rate fulfills the exclusion 
restriction for regressions for ΔROAt,t+2, ΔOMt,t+2 and ΔATOt,t+2. 
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Table 8 continued 
 (1) 
∆R0A 
(2) 
∆0M 
(3) 
∆AT0 
(4) 
∆Pen_Emp 
ΔWC 0.136*** 0.135*** 0.374*** –0.334** 
 (0.019) (0.030) (0.074) (0.159) 
ΔDiv –0.007 –0.006 –0.113 0.039 
 (0.053) (0.092) (0.224) (0.443) 
Q 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.028* –0.073** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.016) (0.037) 
Size 0.004 0.006 –0.019 –0.250*** 
 (0.009) (0.015) (0.036) (0.085) 
Tang 0.190*** 0.221*** 0.898*** –1.895*** 
 (0.050) (0.079) (0.192) (0.429) 
WC 0.035 0.008 0.125 –0.458 
 (0.037) (0.058) (0.142) (0.299) 
Div –0.561*** –0.414 –1.676*** –0.154 
 (0.166) (0.265) (0.645) (1.405) 
CumRet –0.014*** –0.032*** –0.070*** 0.022 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.013) (0.029) 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Wald chi-2 (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Over-identification J-stat  
(p-value) 
0.18 0.97 0.11 0.00 
    
N 16,920 16,868 16,875 16,209 
6. CONCLUSION 
Using a sample of 27,883 firm-years, we examine the US manufacturing firms in  
1990–2013 and find that DB-plan coverage is negatively associated with the propensity 
of making a major investment defined as a large capital expenditure or an acquisition of 
a firm. However, subject to a major investment decision, a firm with higher DB-plan 
coverage is more likely to acquire other firms than to invest in fixed assets. More 
interestingly, we find that among acquisitions, a firm with high DB-plan coverage 
prefers diversifying acquisitions (cross-border or cross-industry) to non-diversifying 
(domestic horizontal) acquisitions or capital expenditures. The findings are consistent 
with both the bargaining motive and conforming motive of investments for DB plan 
offering firms. However, further evidence shows that although firms with higher DB-plan 
coverage experience a greater improvement in operating profitability and asset 
turnover after diversifying acquisitions. Besides, in those investments, they tend to 
invest in countries or industries with stronger unionized workforce. Therefore, their 
investments are likely to be driven by the conforming motive rather than the bargaining 
motive. In contrast, firms with higher DB-plan coverage experience a greater reduction 
in operating profitability and profit margin after large capital expenditures or non-
diversifying acquisitions and an increase in pension expense. The finding suggests that 
cost cutting is difficult after investing in existing businesses, especially when existing 
employees are strongly unionized. As a result, firms tend to under-invest in existing 
businesses to avoid more assets being exposed to labor bargaining.  
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Our results suggest that DB plan sponsoring firms have multiple considerations in their 
investment decisions. On one hand, most of their employees are unionized and have 
strong ability and incentives to bargain. As suggested by theoretical predictions from 
previous studies (Lommerud, Straume, and Sorgard 2003, 2006; Eckel and Egger 
2009), when firms face strong labor bargaining power, they may under-invest or prefer 
investing in areas less subject to labor scrutiny. On the other hand, they have to 
respect and accept the presence of labor unions in order to gain their supports for 
major decisions. They signal their acceptance of unionized workforce by investing in 
countries or industries with strong unionized workforce. Our findings on their choices of 
location and industry in cross-border acquisitions and cross-industry acquisitions 
support this view. 
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